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Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)
Milan Horniacek
€ 66.95
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Description for Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)
Paperback. Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. The book studies this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Num Pages: 92 pages, biography. BIC Classification: KCA; KCC; KCD; KCH. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 236 x 123 x 6. Weight in Grams: 164. Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. 102 pages, black & white illustrations. Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. The book studies this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. Cateogry: (P) Professional & Vocational. BIC Classification: KCA; KCC; KCD; KCH. Dimension: 236 x 123 x 6. Weight: 164.
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good ... Read more
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good ... Read more
Product Details
Format
Paperback
Publication date
2011
Publisher
Springer
Number of pages
170
Condition
New
Series
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Number of Pages
92
Place of Publication
Berlin, Germany
ISBN
9783642197628
SKU
V9783642197628
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 15 to 20 working days
Ref
99-15
About Milan Horniacek
Milan Horniaček is currently an Associate Professor of Economics at the Institute of Public Policy and Economics of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences of the Comenius University in Bratislava. His research interests include non-cooperative game theory, industrial organization, antitrust policy and microeconomic theory. The analysis of equilibria in infinite horizon non-cooperative games that are immune to deviations by ... Read more
Reviews for Cooperation and Efficiency in Markets (Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems)
From the reviews: “The book under review studies the theory of repeated games in oligopoly theory and analyzes countably infinite repetition (or supergame) of interactions between firms on both sides of a market with dicounting of future profits. … The results of the book may be useful in adjusting antitrust policy and competition policy in the world.” (Weiping Li, ... Read more