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David E. Lewis - Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997 - 9780804745901 - V9780804745901
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Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997

€ 42.60
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Description for Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997 Paperback. This book explains why, when, and how political actors create administrative agencies in such a way as to insulate them from political control, particularly presidential control. Num Pages: 240 pages, 17 illustrations. BIC Classification: 1KBB; 3JJP; JPQ; KNV. Category: (G) General (US: Trade); (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 5817 x 3887 x 15. Weight in Grams: 381.

The administrative state is the nexus of American policy making in the postwar period. The vague and sometimes conflicting policy mandates of Congress, the president, and courts are translated into real public policy in the bureaucracy. As the role of the national government has expanded, the national legislature and executive have increasingly delegated authority to administrative agencies to make fundamental policy decisions. How this administrative state is designed, its coherence, its responsiveness, and its efficacy determine, in Robert Dahl’s phrase, “who gets what, when, and how.” This study of agency design, thus, has implications for the study of politics in ... Read more

The structure of bureaucracies can determine the degree to which political actors can change the direction of agency policy. Politicians frequently attempt to lock their policy preferences into place through insulating structures that are mandated by statute or executive decree. This insulation of public bureaucracies such as the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Election Commission, and the National Nuclear Security Administration, is essential to understanding both administrative policy outputs and executive-legislative politics in the United States.

This book explains why, when, and how political actors create administrative agencies in such a way as to insulate them from political control, particularly presidential control.

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Product Details

Format
Paperback
Publication date
2004
Publisher
Stanford University Press United States
Number of pages
240
Condition
New
Number of Pages
240
Place of Publication
Palo Alto, United States
ISBN
9780804745901
SKU
V9780804745901
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 7 to 11 working days
Ref
99-50

About David E. Lewis
David E. Lewis is Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Reviews for Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997
"...Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design is simply one of the finest scholarly treatises on U.S. executive politics to be published during the past decade."—Presidential Studies Quarterly "Lewis has written a book that provides theoretical fodder for scholars in a variety of different fields. This is an excellent book on agency design, but it aso tells us a great ... Read more

Goodreads reviews for Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997


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