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When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation
Guillaume Plantin
€ 68.92
€ 54.12
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Description for When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation
Hardback. Applying developments in corporate finance theory and the economic theory of organizations, this work describes in practical terms how such authorities could be created and given the incentives to behave exactly like bankers behave toward borrowers, as "tough" claimholders. Num Pages: 112 pages, 1, black & white illustrations. BIC Classification: KFFN; KNST. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 216 x 140 x 9. Weight in Grams: 28.
In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms. Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too ... Read more
In the 1990s, large insurance companies failed in virtually every major market, prompting a fierce and ongoing debate about how to better protect policyholders. Drawing lessons from the failures of four insurance companies, When Insurers Go Bust dramatically advances this debate by arguing that the current approach to insurance regulation should be replaced with mechanisms that replicate the governance of non-financial firms. Rather than immediately addressing the minutiae of supervision, Guillaume Plantin and Jean-Charles Rochet first identify a fundamental economic rationale for supervising the solvency of insurance companies: policyholders are the "bankers" of insurance companies. But because policyholders are too ... Read more
Product Details
Format
Hardback
Publication date
2007
Publisher
Princeton University Press United States
Number of pages
110
Condition
New
Number of Pages
112
Place of Publication
New Jersey, United States
ISBN
9780691129358
SKU
V9780691129358
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 7 to 11 working days
Ref
99-1
About Guillaume Plantin
Guillaume Plantin is Assistant Professor of Finance at London Business School. He is the coauthor of "Theorie du Risque et Reassurance". Jean-Charles Rochet is Professor of Mathematics and Economics at the University of Toulouse and a visiting professor of finance at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He is the coauthor of "Microeconomics of Banking".
Reviews for When Insurers Go Bust: An Economic Analysis of the Role and Design of Prudential Regulation
"This book provides a rare economic analysis of the regulation of the insurance industry from two authoritative authors. The book is timely and well researched, and it brings together the current state of the art in economic analysis with a thorough understanding of the institutions. It will become essential reading for anyone interested in this important policy area."—Hyun Song Shin, ... Read more