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Brian F. Crisp - Democratic Institutional Design - 9780804735704 - V9780804735704
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Democratic Institutional Design

€ 89.30
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Description for Democratic Institutional Design hardcover. Based on the policy-making structures of the Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature, and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the electoral system and changing partisan strengths. Num Pages: 296 pages, 20 tables. BIC Classification: 1KLC; 1KLS; JPHV; KCP. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 5817 x 3887 x 24. Weight in Grams: 544.

Based on the policy-making structures of Venezuelan government, this book examines the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and legislature and shows how the powers of each branch are exercised given the incentives established by the electoral system and changing partisan strengths. Several institutional characteristics have led to a passive legislature and an activist chief executive. The advantages presidents enjoy as a result of their constitutional and partisan powers are demonstrated by a wealth of empirical evidence, including records of votes of censure, initiation of legislation, and the use of decree authority.

Because of its dominance, the Venezuelan executive ... Read more

The author places Venezuela in a comparative context with other Latin American states on three issues: the likelihood that executives will receive disciplined, majority support in the legislature; the constitutional powers of presidents; and the degree to which business and labor are formally incorporated through single peak associations. Participation and policy-making processes vary significantly across Latin American democracies, with few others reaching the level of centralization that has characterized Venezuela. At the other end of the spectrum, some Latin American institutional designs are characterized by diffusion and fragmentation. In conclusion, the author offers a blueprint to modify some of the counterproductive patterns associated with Venezuela, one of the longest-lived but now troubled democracies in Latin America.

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Product Details

Format
Hardback
Publication date
2000
Publisher
Stanford University Press United States
Number of pages
296
Condition
New
Number of Pages
296
Place of Publication
Palo Alto, United States
ISBN
9780804735704
SKU
V9780804735704
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 15 to 20 working days
Ref
99-15

About Brian F. Crisp
Brian F. Crisp is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Arizona.

Reviews for Democratic Institutional Design
"The strong point of this book is its empirical focus which includes comparisons with other Latin American nations and proposals to overcome the concentration of power."—Latin American Studies "This text is an excellent example of how research into a particular case can be carefully extrapolated to a broader context and for that reason alone merits reading by comparativists."—Comparative Political Studies ... Read more

Goodreads reviews for Democratic Institutional Design


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