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Being Realistic About Reasons
T. M. Scanlon
€ 67.65
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Description for Being Realistic About Reasons
Hardback. Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T. M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defense of normative cognitivism-the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action. Num Pages: 144 pages. BIC Classification: HPK; HPM; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 223 x 136 x 15. Weight in Grams: 290.
T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief. Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflective equilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense of normative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers an interpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium.
Product Details
Format
Hardback
Publication date
2014
Publisher
Oxford University Press United Kingdom
Number of pages
160
Condition
New
Number of Pages
144
Place of Publication
Oxford, United Kingdom
ISBN
9780199678488
SKU
V9780199678488
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 15 to 20 working days
Ref
99-4
About T. M. Scanlon
T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy (CUP, 2003), and Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Harvard University Press, 2008).
Reviews for Being Realistic About Reasons
a powerful and superbly written short book
Barry Maguire, The Times Literary Supplement
T. M. Scanlon's new book is essential reading for anybody interested in metaethics and practical rationality.
Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter, Ethics
a much needed challenge to all forms of non-cognitivism.
Bruce Russell, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Scanlon delivers new insights and develops new ways of thinking about normative claims. His book thereby introduces engaging ways of discussing normative theory that should be further developed and brought to bear on actual discussions. As such Being Realistic about Reasons shows us an independent thinker outlining his current thinking about normative claims. His book is a challenge to all non-cognitivist theories of moral thinking and proponents who try to interpret moral terms in naturalistic terms such as "water" and the likes. Hopefully it will be taken on.
Metapsychology Reviews Online
T. M. Scanlon is a towering figure in moral and political philosophy ... Throughout, this new book reveals the impressive creative intelligence that always characterizes Scanlon's work. It is an important work, which all metaethicists will have to come to grips with, since it defends a distinctive position about these central metaethical questions.
Ralph Wedgwood, The Philosophical Quarterly
intelligent and candid book
A. W. Price, Mind
Barry Maguire, The Times Literary Supplement
T. M. Scanlon's new book is essential reading for anybody interested in metaethics and practical rationality.
Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter, Ethics
a much needed challenge to all forms of non-cognitivism.
Bruce Russell, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews
Scanlon delivers new insights and develops new ways of thinking about normative claims. His book thereby introduces engaging ways of discussing normative theory that should be further developed and brought to bear on actual discussions. As such Being Realistic about Reasons shows us an independent thinker outlining his current thinking about normative claims. His book is a challenge to all non-cognitivist theories of moral thinking and proponents who try to interpret moral terms in naturalistic terms such as "water" and the likes. Hopefully it will be taken on.
Metapsychology Reviews Online
T. M. Scanlon is a towering figure in moral and political philosophy ... Throughout, this new book reveals the impressive creative intelligence that always characterizes Scanlon's work. It is an important work, which all metaethicists will have to come to grips with, since it defends a distinctive position about these central metaethical questions.
Ralph Wedgwood, The Philosophical Quarterly
intelligent and candid book
A. W. Price, Mind