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Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
Gilbert Harman
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Description for Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity
Paperback. Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Series: Great Debates in Philosophy. Num Pages: 240 pages, 0. BIC Classification: HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 228 x 155 x 15. Weight in Grams: 396.
Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework.
Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework.
Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the ... Read more
Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.
Show LessProduct Details
Format
Paperback
Publication date
1995
Publisher
John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Number of pages
240
Condition
New
Series
Great Debates in Philosophy
Number of Pages
240
Place of Publication
Hoboken, United Kingdom
ISBN
9780631192114
SKU
V9780631192114
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 7 to 11 working days
Ref
99-50
About Gilbert Harman
Gilbert Harman is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Princeton. His publications include Thought (1973), The Nature of Morality (1977), and Change in View (1986). Judith Jarvis Thomson is Professor of Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her publications include The Realm of Rights (1990), and Rights, Restitution and Risk (1986).
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