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Language, Reality and Mind: A Defense of Everyday Thought
Charles Crittenden
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Description for Language, Reality and Mind: A Defense of Everyday Thought
Hardcover. The relation between common-sense belief and scientific theory is debated in contemporary philosophy. This book offers a defense of ordinary belief and outlines its contents on the nature of reality, the soundness of ordinary language, and the existence of the mind and its relation to the body. Num Pages: 244 pages, biography. BIC Classification: CFA; HPCF5; HPK; HPM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 222 x 138 x 19. Weight in Grams: 410.
The relation between common-sense belief and scientific theory is hotly debated in contemporary philosophy. The author gives an extended defense of ordinary belief and outlines its contents on the nature of reality, the soundness of ordinary language, and the existence of the mind and its relation to the body.
The relation between common-sense belief and scientific theory is hotly debated in contemporary philosophy. The author gives an extended defense of ordinary belief and outlines its contents on the nature of reality, the soundness of ordinary language, and the existence of the mind and its relation to the body.
Product Details
Format
Hardback
Publication date
2009
Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan
Number of pages
248
Condition
New
Number of Pages
234
Place of Publication
Basingstoke, United Kingdom
ISBN
9780230576940
SKU
V9780230576940
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 15 to 20 working days
Ref
99-15
About Charles Crittenden
CHARLES CRITTENDEN is Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at California State University, Northridge, USA. He is the author of Unreality: The Metaphysics of Fictional Objects and articles on philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, metaphysics, social and political philosophy, and non-Western religion.
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