Winfield has achieved a fundamental, systematic and comprehensive re-thinking of the problem of mind. Grounded in a critical reconstruction of Aristotle and Hegel, it draws upon a broad range of ancient, modern and contemporary philosophers to establish that mind must necessarily be materially embodied in living, animal organism, and must manifest itself in the three distinguishable phases of psyche, consciousness and intelligence, thoroughly exploring the sometimes surprising implications of such an analysis. It answers the need for a thoroughly non-Cartesian account of mind better than any available alternative. I would not teach the philosophy of mind again without using this work.
Philip T. Grier, Thomas Bowman Professor of Philosophy and Religion, Dickinson College Winfield (Univ. of Georgia), best known for his work on Hegel and in social/political philosophy, here turns his attention to the philosophy of mind. The theory he offers, which is heavily influenced by both Hegel and Aristotle, resists categorization in the standard terms of the contemporary debate. Though Winfield firmly rejects the view of the mind as immaterial, he also denies that one can reduce mentality to material or functional processes. In his view, mind is essentially embodied in animal form and thus is best conceived of in a "zoological" manner. This comes closest, perhaps, to the kind of nonreductive materialism associated with John Searle. In contrast to Searle's view, Winfield sees mind as comprising three distinct elements: a preconscious psyche, a nondiscursive consciousness and self-consciousness, and an intelligence. The book is strongest in its arguments against Cartesianism and its efforts to establish the material preconditions of mind. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-level undergraduates and above.
CHOICE