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Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons
Andreas Wenger
€ 197.83
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Description for Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons
hardcover. Num Pages: 448 pages. BIC Classification: JW. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 234 x 163 x 31. Weight in Grams: 808.
Living with Peril explains in detail how the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations adapted to the reality of a Soviet nuclear force capable of destroying the United States and against which there was no effective defense. Wenger illuminates the development, implementation, and evolution of U.S. government policies designed to avoid war and to respond to the vulnerability of nuclear destruction. Drawing from a wealth of sources, Wenger provides an insightful and original perspective on the origins of cold war nuclear diplomacy. This is crucial reading for students and scholars of international relations, peace and conflict studies, and diplomatic history.
Product Details
Format
Hardback
Publication date
1997
Publisher
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers United States
Number of pages
448
Condition
New
Number of Pages
448
Place of Publication
Lanham, MD, United States
ISBN
9780847685141
SKU
V9780847685141
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 15 to 20 working days
Ref
99-15
About Andreas Wenger
Andreas Wenger is deputy director of the Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich.
Reviews for Living with Peril: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Nuclear Weapons
During the presidential administrations of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy the United States slipped from a position of massive nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union to one of perceived mutual vulnerability. Drawing extensively upon archival materials, Andreas Wenger, a leading young Swiss analyst of world politics, argues that these were the decisive years of the nuclear era, the years when the most
Nuclear Learning
Thoroughly researched and well argued, this book makes a major contribution to the literature.
R. L. Wendzel, United States Air University This is a meticulously researched and well-written analysis of a very important historical period, and of a very important set of issues involving nuclear history. It makes new contributions in many areas, and addresses several perennial questions and sheds much new light on them. . . . Highly recommended to historians of the nuclear age, and to students pursuing research topics in this area or time period. It provides all researchers a wealth of new information and quotes.
Niall Michelsen, Roosevelt University Wenger's highly readable account comes as close as historians are likely to get to an authoritative retelling of a complex past.
Richard H. Ullman, Princeton University Wenger narrates a compelling account of the political and psycological forces that shaped the nuclear weapons strategies of Eisenhower and Kennedy. Wenger convincingly demonstrates that the level of destruction inherent in nuclear use created a gap between the theory and pratice of nuclear strategy. Wenger contributes a timely reminder of these realities and the continuing importance of the past for comtemporary nuclear debates.
Patricia Ownes
Cambridge Review of International Affairs
Historians and political scientists will find new insights into the debate surrounding the Cold War and American policy based on deterrence and change . . . a real tour de force.
Joseph Richard Goldman, University of Minnesota It is one of the many strengths of Wenger's exemplary and well-researched study to remind a new generation of IR students (whose indifference to history is wondrous to behold) of the complexity of a world that once was, but is no more.
Michael Cox, University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Political Studies Review
Meticulously documented and researched...Highly recommended for historian of the nuclear age and for students pursuing research topics in this area or time period.
Niall Michelsen
H-Pol, February 1998
Nuclear Learning
Thoroughly researched and well argued, this book makes a major contribution to the literature.
R. L. Wendzel, United States Air University This is a meticulously researched and well-written analysis of a very important historical period, and of a very important set of issues involving nuclear history. It makes new contributions in many areas, and addresses several perennial questions and sheds much new light on them. . . . Highly recommended to historians of the nuclear age, and to students pursuing research topics in this area or time period. It provides all researchers a wealth of new information and quotes.
Niall Michelsen, Roosevelt University Wenger's highly readable account comes as close as historians are likely to get to an authoritative retelling of a complex past.
Richard H. Ullman, Princeton University Wenger narrates a compelling account of the political and psycological forces that shaped the nuclear weapons strategies of Eisenhower and Kennedy. Wenger convincingly demonstrates that the level of destruction inherent in nuclear use created a gap between the theory and pratice of nuclear strategy. Wenger contributes a timely reminder of these realities and the continuing importance of the past for comtemporary nuclear debates.
Patricia Ownes
Cambridge Review of International Affairs
Historians and political scientists will find new insights into the debate surrounding the Cold War and American policy based on deterrence and change . . . a real tour de force.
Joseph Richard Goldman, University of Minnesota It is one of the many strengths of Wenger's exemplary and well-researched study to remind a new generation of IR students (whose indifference to history is wondrous to behold) of the complexity of a world that once was, but is no more.
Michael Cox, University of Wales, Aberystwyth
Political Studies Review
Meticulously documented and researched...Highly recommended for historian of the nuclear age and for students pursuing research topics in this area or time period.
Niall Michelsen
H-Pol, February 1998