In his 2013 State of the Union Address, President Obama stated that the United States would engage Russia to seek further reduction in our nuclear arsenals . These reductions could include limits on strategic, non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons. Yet, arms control negotiation between the United States and Russia have stalled, leading many observers to suggest that the United States reduce its nuclear forces unilaterally, or in parallel with Russia, without negotiating a new treaty. Many in Congress have expressed concerns about this possibility, both because they question the need to reduce nuclear forces below New START levels and because they do not want the President to agree to further reductions without seeking the approval of Congress. This book reviews the role of nuclear arms control in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, looking at both formal, bilateral treaties and unilateral steps the United States took to alter its nuclear posture. An analytic framework is discussed reviewing the characteristics of the different mechanisms, focusing on issues such as balance and equality, predictability, flexibility, transparency and confidences in compliance, and timeliness.