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Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information
Wolfgang Ryll
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Description for Litigation and Settlement in a Game with Incomplete Information
Paperback. This text investigates a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. The experimental design aims to allow investigation of how subjects solve the bargaining problem. Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems. Num Pages: 184 pages, 7 black & white illustrations, biography. BIC Classification: KCA; KCP; PBWH. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 233 x 155 x 10. Weight in Grams: 610.
We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». ... Read more
We investigate a two-person game of litigation and settlement with incomplete information on one side. So far, various theoretical attempts have been made to answer the question of why some people choose not to resolve their disputes and instead go to court and incur litigation costs, even if bargaining leaves room for both parties to fare better when avoiding the conflict. We can distinguish between games which focus on strategic elements like games with incomplete information (see, for example, P'ng (1983), Samuelson (1982) and Schweizer (1989» and decision-theoretic models neglecting strategic elements (see, for example, Landes (1971) and Gould (1973». ... Read more
Product Details
Format
Paperback
Publication date
1996
Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG Germany
Number of pages
184
Condition
New
Series
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems
Number of Pages
176
Place of Publication
Berlin, Germany
ISBN
9783540613046
SKU
V9783540613046
Shipping Time
Usually ships in 15 to 20 working days
Ref
99-15
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